The present stalemate in climate negotiations between the US and the other Annex I countries has led policy analysts and economists to explore the possible emergence of alternative climate regimes that may be applied after 2012. This paper explores the idea of replacing international cooperation on greenhouse gas emission control with international cooperation on climate-related technological innovation and diffusion. This idea -recently proposed among others by Barrett (2001) and Benedick (2001) -is based on the insight that incentives to free ride are much smaller in the case of technological cooperation than in the case of cooperation on emission control. This paper provides a first applied game theory analysis of a technology-based climate protocol by assessing: (i) the selfenforcingness (namely, the absence of incentives to free ride) of the coalition that would form when countries negotiate on climate-related technological cooperation; (ii) the environmental effectiveness of a technology-based climate protocol. The analysis is carried out by using a model in which endogenous and induced technical change are explicitly modelled. The results of our analysis partly support Barrett's and Benedick's conjecture. On the one hand, a self-enforcing agreement is more likely to emerge when countries cooperate on environmental technological innovation and diffusion than when they cooperate on emission abatement. However, technological cooperation -without any commitment to emission control -may not lead to a sufficient abatement of greenhouse gas concentrations.
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Economic and Environmental Effectiveness of a
Technology-based Climate Protocol Barbara Buchner
Introduction
Climate change control is a global governance problem. Any strategy to control climate change will only be effective if adopted by as many countries as possible, or at least by a number of countries which account for a large share of total emissions. However, due to the absence of a supranational authority that can enforce environmental policies and regulations on a global scale, climate change control can only be achieved via voluntary initiatives and international agreements among sovereign countries.
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In the context of climate change, the Kyoto Protocol was welcomed as an important achievement in international diplomacy, because, for the first time, it succeeded in establishing binding emissions reduction targets for industrialised countries. However, the US decision not to ratify the Protocol has largely reduced its environmental effectiveness, thus inducing all countries to adapt their own climate strategy to a new scenario in which some major current and potential future greenhouse gas emitters do not cooperate on emission control.
Even though Russia' s decision to ratify the Protocol made the Protocol to enter into force on February 16, 2005, its environmental effectiveness is widely recognised as very limited. Therefore, a number of alternative proposals designed to increase the environmental effectiveness of an international climate agreement have emerged. 2 The environmental effectiveness of a climate agreement can be enhanced through two main steps: (i) by increasing the number of signatory countries, and (ii) by making abatement targets more stringent. As a consequence, new recent proposals on climate change policy address both the issue of participation incentives and the issue of long-run costs of effective abatement targets.
Among recent proposals on climate policy, there is the idea -supported among others by Barrett (2001) and Benedick (2001) -to replace international cooperation on greenhouse gas emission control with international cooperation on climate-related technological innovation and diffusion.
This idea is based both on theoretical arguments and on empirical facts.
First, theory suggests that incentives to free-ride are much smaller in the case of technological cooperation than in the case of cooperation on emission control (Cf. Carraro and Siniscalco, 1995, 1997; Yi, 1997) .
Therefore, a technology-based climate protocol could be self-enforcing, i.e.
it could be signed by all or almost all countries worldwide. Second, in recent years countries have begun to adopt domestic policy measures and to sign bilateral and multilateral deals to enhance investments in R&D and the diffusion of climate-related technologies (see Section 2 below for an overview). This seems to confirm that agreements on environmental technological cooperation are easier to sign and implement than agreements on emission abatement.
However, albeit self-enforcing -a property which is unlikely to be shared by climate regimes where cooperation concerns emission control -a technology-based climate regime may not be environmentally effective. The reason for this is that while, on the one hand, cooperation on climate-related technological innovation and diffusion reduces emissions per unit of output, abatement costs and therefore global GHG emissions, on the other hand, investments in R&D, as well as the adoption of new technologies and new standards, stimulate economic growth both in developed and developing countries, thus increasing global emissions. The outcome of these two combined effects cannot easily be assessed using only a theoretical framework. A quantitative analysis becomes necessary in order to verify whether the adoption of a technology-based climate regime actually reduces GHG emissions. This is the key objective of this paper.
Using the FEEM RICE model -a modified version of Nordhaus and Yang's (1996) and Nordhaus and Boyer's (2000) RICE model -we will make an initial assessment of the environmental and economic benefits of a technology-based protocol, and in particular of whether the total amount of global emissions is actually reduced by the adoption of an international agreement in which all countries find it profitable to cooperate on technological innovation and diffusion. In order to test the robustness of the analysis we will use two different models with different specifications of how technical change evolves over time. In addition, sensitivity analysis on the key parameters of the models will be carried out.
We proceed as follows. In section 2, we present an overview of recent climate initiatives and developments in climate policy. Section 3 describes some policy proposals designed to overcome some of the shortcomings of the Kyoto Protocol. In particular, we present the main features of Barrett's (2001 Barrett's ( , 2002 ) and Benedick's (2001) proposal. In section 4, we use the FEEM RICE model to examine whether a technology-based climate regime would actually yield economic benefits and increase environmental effectiveness. The final section draws some policy conclusions.
Climate negotiations and bilateral technological agreements
In spite of the US decision to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol, several climate initiatives have been developed both within and outside the Kyoto policy framework. On the one hand, in several Annex B countries measures to achieve the Kyoto targets have been adopted (e.g. the EU Directive on emission trading or the Japanese climate plan). On the other hand, the US has implemented a domestic climate policy designed to achieve a -18% Barrett's (2001 Barrett's ( , 2002 ) and Benedick's (2001) proposal to adopt a technology-based climate protocol might be a better way to address climate change than a protocol in which countries must agree on voluntary GHG emission reductions. However, the recent initiatives briefly outlined in this section are merely indicators of a possible evolution of climate policy, but do not yet support any conclusions in favour of a technology-based climate protocol. This is why we plan to address this issue in this paper and to provide an assessment of this policy proposal, which will be described in greater detail in the next section.
A climate policy regime based on technological cooperation
Despite the fact that the Kyoto Protocol eventually entered into force on (Nordhaus, 2001) or on a set of harmonised domestic carbon taxes (Cooper, 1998) Other proposals aim at reducing the expected costs of the Kyoto Protocol by introducing hybrid policy instruments, e.g. the combination of a quantity instrument (such as emissions trading) with a price instrument (such as a tax or safety valve) 11 . Other proposals suggest adopting a step-by-step approach to climate policy by focusing first on regional agreements (regional "bubbles" to be developed within the Kyoto Protocol) and then moving on to a global agreement 12 .
More radical proposals are based on the observation, largely shared by climate scientists, that without a real technological breakthrough it will be very difficult to achieve the stabilisation of GHG concentrations.
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Therefore, an effective climate regime should be based on measures that enhance climate-friendly technological innovation and dissemination and reduce the future costs of greenhouse gas abatement.
The idea that technological cooperation is the appropriate tool to deal with the problem of global warming is not only the basis of the Bush administration's climate policy, but has also been proposed as the framework of a new approach to climate policy at international level by Barrett (2001 Barrett ( , 2002 and Benedick (2001) . They argue that an international agreement for the development and diffusion of technologies designed to reduce GHG emissions could be a possible approach that countries may decide to adopt to combat climate change 14 .
As discussed in section 2, the idea of a technology-based climate protocol is not based on a vacuum. The proliferation of bilateral agreements on technology cooperation -and on climate technology cooperation in particular -would seem to indicate that the proposal for a technology-based climate protocol is worth serious consideration. This type of protocol could be established within the UNFCCC and could be a complement, if not a substitute, of the Kyoto Protocol.
Let us provide a more detailed description of this idea. Barrett (2001 Barrett ( , 2002 and Benedick (2001) propose a technology-based international strategy to tackle the incentives to free-ride which usually undermine the possibility of cooperation on emission control. In particular, Barrett (2001 Barrett ( , 2002 argues that the Kyoto Protocol provides poor incentives for participation and compliance and tries to solve this problem by suggesting an alternative climate regime, which is based on common incentives for the development and adoption of climate-friendly technologies.
The main elements of this proposal include cooperative funding of basic R&D into energy-saving, climate-friendly technologies on the one hand, and the implementation of various standards directed towards the world-wide adoption and diffusion of new technologies on the other. Common standards for technologies are identified through collaborative research efforts 15 , which are financed through the global R&D fund. Every country should be given the option to sign both the standards protocol and the cooperative R&D protocol. Since standards are a public good, no country can be excluded from using them. By imposing an open standards protocol, Barrett accounts for competition which induces pull incentives. In addition, the standards protocol is intended to be non-exclusionary in order to encourage the widespread adoption and diffusion of new technologies.
However, to construct a global climate regime which is accepted by all countries, an element of fairness needs to be incorporated, taking into account that the current accumulation of GHG emissions in the atmosphere is basically caused by the industrialised countries. In order to provide incentives for the developing countries to adopt the new standards which will require costly technologies, Barrett suggests making the share of each country's contribution to collaborative funding dependent on its circumstances 16 . In this way, the need for the developing countries to grow is satisfied but -acknowledging that they will probably be the biggest future emitters -they nevertheless take part in a climate regime. In addition, taking the Montreal Protocol as an example, the industrialised countries are made responsible for the financing of technological transfers. Thus, a multilateral fund would ensure that technologies can spread to developing countries. In this way, this approach sets incentives for their participation becausealthough being bound by the technology standards -they can gain through the diffusion of technologies in their countries which is basically financed by industrialised countries.
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Barrett emphasises that the attractiveness of this approach -based on a R&D Protocol with complementary standards protocols -lies in the inclusion of both "push" incentives affecting the supply of R&D, and "pull" incentives aimed at the demand for the benefits of R&D. In contrast, the Kyoto Protocol does not consider the necessity to push R&D, but is based solely on the pull incentives which only work by strong enforcement. Also, by focusing on incentives related to the funding of R&D, preconditions for 16 In addition, the country's contribution should be contingent on an agreed total expenditure level and the contribution of the other countries (Barrett, 2002) . The latter element ensures that the fund becomes larger when countries join the cooperation agreement and smaller when countries withdraw. In this way, an explicit incentive for participation is created and -very important -countries know their commitment costs before signing the agreement.
long-term technical innovation and diffusion are created. Moreover, because emission targets and time tables are not imposed, this technology-based climate regime does not require the enforcement of compliance, but does provide incentives for participation.
Note that the more countries adopt a standard, the more attractive it becomes for other countries to adopt the same standard. Hence, the more countries combat climate change, the greater are the incentives for other countries to follow suit. Therefore, there is no need for strong enforcement and monitoring. Once enough countries adopt the standards, none of them will have an incentive to defect from the agreement.
These considerations are also consistent with the recommendations derived from game theory models that study the effects of cooperation on technological innovation (Cf. Yi, 1997) . If technological spillovers are limited, technological cooperation provides a club good, where benefits from cooperation are partly excludable (i.e. free riders achieve a small benefit). In this case, the equilibrium coalition structure often coincides with the grand coalition. 18 By contrast, as shown in Bloch (1997) , in the case of public goods, the equilibrium of the coalition game is characterised -in the most favourable cases -by a constellation of small groups of cooperating countries (climate blocs).
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Although there is no doubt that the technology-based approach also has a number of weaknesses 20 , it does account for some of the crucial 18 Of course other assumptions are necessary, e.g. that asymmetries are negligible and that the agreement is profitable (see Yi, 1997) . However, what matters in our context is the excludability of benefits from cooperation that provides incentives for all or almost all players to join the coalition.
19 See also Carraro and Marchiori (2003) and the other papers in Carraro (2003) . 20 For example, there are problems in ensuring that the "right/best" standards are chosen and that the adoption of these standards indeed offers every participating country a benefit in excess of the cost. An additional question is who will choose the standards. A further concern is that the system gets locked in to a particular standard which would remove the incentives for further innovation.
requirements needed to make an international climate regime successful: a global scale, strong elements for self-enforcement and a high degree of probability that the international system will support the approach. Nash game between the six players. In the second version, there is a more detailed geographical disaggregation (8 regions) and a better representation of the production structure. Again, an open-loop Nash equilibrium is used to determine the optimal dynamic paths of all variables.
Most importantly, technical change is better modelled in the second version of FEEM RICE. In the first version, a stock of knowledge, cumulated through R&D investments, affects both factor productivity and the emission-output ratio. Therefore, the model adopts a standard Learning by
Researching approach (Cf. Goulder and Mathai, 2000) . In the second 
R&D (t=1) TP (t=1)
Emissions ( Therefore, they implement their domestic welfare maximising abatement rate. The same holds for the third strategic variable -investment -which is again set by all countries in order to maximise domestic welfare.
By contrast, in our benchmark policy setting in which the Annex B -US countries are supposed to comply with the Kyoto Protocol, their abatement rates are set so as to achieve the Kyoto targets, whereas the US, CHN and ROW implement their domestic welfare maximising abatement rate 21 . As for the other two strategic variables, they are set by all countries in a way that maximises their own domestic welfare.
In order to give technological cooperation the highest probability of being successful, we assume that climate policy is undertaken through domestic policy and measures (no flexibility mechanisms). Recent studies have
shown that R&D and flexibility mechanisms are strategic substitutes 22 . As a 21 As already said, when deriving the results for the actual Kyoto coalition consisting of EU, JPN and FSU, we adopt the so-called "Kyoto forever" scenario which is used in most of the literature on the economic costs of climate policy. See e.g., Buonanno, Carraro and Galeotti (2002) ; Manne and Richels (1999) ; and Chapter 8 of IPCC (2001) . In particular, we assume that countries which have agreed with the Marrakech negotiations commit themselves to meeting the existing Kyoto constraints from 2012 onward, given that no emission targets beyond 2012 are yet defined.
22 Buonanno, Carraro and Galeotti (2002) show that an international trading system, by lowering the cost of complying with the Kyoto targets, also lowers the incentives to undertake environment-friendly R&D. Therefore, at the equilibrium, R&D expenditure is consequence, countries have the largest incentive to profit from the benefits yielded by R&D cooperation when flexibility mechanisms are not allowed for.
In the FEEM RICE model, technical change is induced by knowledge accumulation, which is the sum of past R&D expenditures. We assume that part of the technological benefits yielded by this knowledge accumulation are a global public good, whereas part of them are a club good that can be appropriated only by the R&D coalition members. Therefore, R&D cooperation is assumed to be an imperfect club good. In the first version of FEEM RICE, a parameter β quantifies the increased share of world knowledge that can be appropriated by countries belonging to the R&D coalition. This parameter is equivalent to the "differential technological spillover" or "coalition information exchange coefficient" in the theoretical model by Carraro and Siniscalco (1995, 1997) . The first version of FEEM RICE is thus characterised by the inclusion of two types of international spillovers and related parameterisation: spillovers -parameterised by ε -which are appropriated by all countries; and spillovers -parameterised by β -which are beneficial only to coalition members. In the second version of FEEM RICE, no estimate of international spillovers is yet included. This is the price to be paid for the more sophisticated formulation of technical change embodied in the second version of FEEM RICE.
Note that the coalition-internal spillovers β play a crucial role in determining the stability of coalitions based on technological cooperation.
Therefore, the coalition stability analysis will be performed only with the first version of the model. The second version of FEEM RICE will instead be used -under the assumption of stable cooperation -to check for the robustness of our conclusions on the effectiveness of technological cooperation in reducing global GHG emissions.
lower in all countries that benefit from emission trading. R&D and emission trading are thus strategic substitutes.
An applied game theory analysis of two technology-based climate regimes
In this section we proceed in a counterfactual manner. First, we assume that only the four "traditional" Kyoto regions (USA, Europe, Japan, Former can induce a reduction of global emissions and/or of the emission/output ratio with respect to the "Kyoto forever" scenario. 23 In addition, this empirical evidence is robust with respect to change of β above 0.2.
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23 At least to the extent that the first version of FEEM RICE model can adequately capture the dynamics of induced technical change. 24 There is a discontinuity with respect to the value of β. As we showed in a different paper (Buchner, Carraro, Cersosimo and Marchiori, 2002 ) for values of β below 0.2, external technological spillovers are too high, i.e. free riders get an excessive benefits from the R&D investments of the coalition and thus the coalition is no longer stable. We find the same result in this paper. Therefore, we perform the sensitivity analysis only for values of β The result that technological cooperation does not seem to be environmental effective when using the formulation with international knowledge spillovers, and when only Annex B countries cooperate on technological innovation and diffusion, depends on two factors.
1) On the one hand, as a consequence of the intensified R&D efforts, production increases. This raises the emissions of the Annex B countries that cooperate on R&D. Emissions per unit of output also increase, because the overall impact of accumulated R&D expenditure on economic growth (the endogenous growth effect) is larger than the impact of accumulated R&D on emission abatement (the induced technical change effect).
above 0.2 (only for stable technological coalitions) and we find that our results are quite robust with respect to changes in β above 0.2.
2) On the other hand, R&D investments in Annex B countries have an impact also on the other countries (developing countries) through technological spillovers that increase output. These countries have more polluting technologies. Therefore, their increased production has a more negative effect on the environment (more emissions) than in Annex B countries, namely developing countries have a worse emission-output ratio and invest less in emission-reducing technologies. As a consequence, the average global emission-output ratio increases.
Also notice that when global emissions and the emission-output ratio increase, they increase with respect to the so called "Kyoto forever"
scenario in which Annex B -US regions have emission targets to be achieved from 2010 onward.
The above negative conclusions on the environmental effectiveness of an international climate protocol based only on technological cooperation are even stronger when looking at the situation in 2050. Both absolute emissions and the aggregate emissions/output ratio increase by almost 50%
with respect to the current situation in which only the EU, Japan and FSU are committed to comply with the Kyoto targets 25 .
The reason for this difference is that the effects of the increased investments in R&D can be seen more clearly in 2050 than in 2010. An important additional reason is that in the medium term technological spillovers have a strong effect on the growth rate of China and ROW (which do not participate in the technological agreement and therefore get part of the technological benefits -through the global spillovers ε -at no cost ).
Can different conclusions be achieved if a global technology-based regimewhich would involve all world countries -is established? In this latter case, international spillover effects on countries outside the technology-based coalition disappear. Therefore, we could expect a much lower increase of global emissions and of the emission-output ratio.
This is indeed shown in Table 2 , where however global emissions still increase with respect to the benchmark "Kyoto forever" scenario, both in the short-run and in the medium-run. However, the emission-output ratio is slightly reduced with respect to the benchmark scenario. Note that in this case results are independent of the value of β -even though β must be larger than 0.2 to guarantee the coalition stability -because all countries/regions are assumed to participate in the technology-based regime,
i.e. they all cooperate on technological innovation and diffusion (without binding emission targets). Therefore, at the equilibrium there is no free riders an no differential technological spillovers. 26 Note that results in the scenario in which all region cooperate on technological innovation and diffusion are consistent with the so called "environmental Kuznets curve" hypothesis. This was not the case for results shown in Table 1 . However, let us also stress that there is no conclusive evidence on the existence of an "environmental Kuznets curve" for GHG emissions. Recent studies find curves of all shapes (see e.g. Kelly, 2003; or Bartz and Kelly, 2004). And Holtz-Eakin and Selden (1995) find that the pace of economic development does not significantly alter the flow of CO2 emissions, thus yielding an "environmental Kuznets curve" that never turns down.
27 Some results obtained in Buchner, Carraro, Cersosimo and Marchiori (2002) provide support to this conclusion. Indeed, we found that total emissions when all or part of the Annex B countries adopt technological cooperation and environmental policy measures to achieve the Kyoto targets, are smaller than total emissions when international cooperation concerns only technological innovation and diffusion. Moreover, with both technological and climate cooperation, global emissions are smaller than the global Kyoto target itself.
With the new model, results are more in favour of a technology-based climate regime. Figure 2 shows the dynamic behaviour of total emissions.
Note that, in the presence of climate-friendly technological cooperation without emission targets, world carbon emissions decrease with respect to emissions in the "Kyoto forever" scenario. However, the comparison is made with the "Kyoto forever" scenario, whose environmental effectiveness is reduced by the absence of mandatory targets for the US, China and other big emitters. This comparison would be useful only if, as in the case of the first version of FEEM RICE, emission in the presence of technological cooperation were larger than in the "Kyoto forever" scenario.
Let us therefore consider a different emission-based scenario. We assume that all countries are committed to achieve a 550 ppm stabilisation goal, and that they can decide to achieve it either with or without technological cooperation. Figure 3 shows the dynamics of carbon emissions when technological cooperation is implemented without an emission target, when the 550 ppm stabilisation target is achieved without technological cooperation, and when technological cooperation is also implemented. There are a few interesting remarks that can be derived by looking at cooperation yields the kind of scenarios outlined in Hanson et al (2004). 28 That is, cooperative technology development (independent of climate policies) drives the market in such a way as to increase both GDP and reduce GHG intensities. As a consequence, if countries cooperate on technological innovation and diffusion, 550 ppmv may become the new reference case; and the capacity of the economy may be sufficiently strengthened such that, when the time arrives and climate issues inevitably emerge as a critical policy driver, there will be significant shift in commitment and resources to achieve an even smaller level of emissions (see also Velte et al., 2004 for this kind of scenario).
Nonetheless, in the presence of technological cooperation, emissions are larger than in the two cases in which an emission target is introduced.
Therefore, a second remark is as follows. The presence of an emission target lowers emissions more than what technological cooperation alone would do.
Is it therefore optimal to have both technological cooperation and a stringent emission target? Figure 3 provides an ambiguous answer. Both with and without technological cooperation it is possible to achieve the stabilisation target. However, the timing of policy is different. With technological cooperation, emissions are smaller at the beginning of the optimisation period and then become larger. The reason is that it is profitable for countries to invest in R&D and to abate emissions early rather than late, in order to exploit the benefits provided by R&D investments and the related learning process. In other words, countries find it optimal to accelerate the movement along the technology learning curves. This is shown in Figure 4 , where R&D investments are larger in the presence of technological cooperation than without it.
In particular, in the first commitment periods, if countries cooperate on technological innovation and diffusion, they find it optimal to increase their R&D investments, which then display their beneficial impacts in the 28 We are grateful to one of the referees for this reference. subsequent periods. Among these positive impacts there are those on economic growth, which however increase emissions, as Figure 3 shows. Therefore, we find again the effect that was dominant in the case of the first version of FEEM RICE, namely that larger initial R&D investments stimulate economic growth and therefore have negative effects on emissions in the long-run. This effect is however milder in the second version of FEEM RICE than in the first version, because of the stronger and more diffuse effects of technical change on carbon intensity and energy efficiency.
It may be interesting to observe what happens when a more stringent abatement target is imposed. Figure 5 , where the dynamics of carbon emissions in the presence of a 450 stabilisation target is also shown, suggests that technological cooperation may be redundant if countries must comply with a more stringent stabilisation goal. The line describing the optimal emission path with technological cooperation almost coincides with the one in which technological cooperation is not carried out. Therefore, in the presence of a very stringent emission target, the amount of R&D investments that a single country finds it optimal to undertake unilaterally almost coincides with the amount that it would undertake in the presence of technological cooperation, i.e. a joint decision about optimal investments in R&D. There is still a difference in the first commitment periods, where more R&D investments are undertaken in the case of technological cooperation. 
Conclusions
The analysis of this paper has been motivated by the increasing number of bilateral deals on technological cooperation that have emerged following the US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol. In addition, and independently of this flow of initiatives on technological cooperation, the proposal of a technology-based climate protocol has been debated from a theoretical perspective and its properties in terms of participation incentives have been highlighted by several authors (e.g. Barrett, 2001 Barrett, , 2002 .
As a consequence, the main objective of this paper was to verify, using an applied game theory approach, whether a climate regime based on cooperation on technological innovation and diffusion, without any binding abatement commitments, could be self-enforcing and yield lower total carbon emissions than the standard -not very environmentally ambitious -"Kyoto forever" regime. Were this conjecture true, a technology-based climate agreement could replace agreements focused on emission abatement targets, because it would provide both stronger incentives to participate and a better performance in terms of environmental effectiveness.
The scenarios that have been analysed in this paper partly support the above conjecture. A technology-based regime is more stable than an emissionbased regime, i.e. more countries are likely to participate in the climate regime. In addition, technological cooperation without emission abatement commitments increases economic growth. However, this strategy is unlikely to lower global GHG emissions, i.e. a technology-based protocol does not seem to be environmentally effective. This conclusion is clearly supported by our analysis with the first version of FEEM RICE, but is less cogent when using the second version of FEEM RICE. In this latter case, technical change is more effective in reducing carbon and energy intensity. Therefore, technological cooperation can do better than a "Kyoto forever" regime in reducing global carbon emissions. However, technological cooperation becomes less and less important as the stringency of the stabilisation goal increases. The reason is that stringent stabilisation goals induce large R&D investments even in the absence of technological cooperation.
Of course, the conclusions of this study need to be tested using other models and other specifications of technical change. This would provide additional evidence on the properties of a technology-based climate protocol and would enable us to draw sounder conclusions. At the same time, the conclusion of this study should not be taken as a rejection of a technologybased protocol. Its solid theoretical properties, the positive signs expressed by the industry towards a technology-based regime and the increased amount of bilateral deals signed among different countries around the world suggest that technological cooperation would be part of a successful strategy to control climate change. Technological cooperation should be considered as an element of a more comprehensive policy strategy through which emission reductions are actually achieved at the global level -possibly in a cost-effective way and with the contribution of most of the world's countries.
